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THE DECLINE IN TAX ADVISER 
PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
John S. Dzienkowski* & Robert J. Peroni** 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States faces a tax-avoidance crisis that seriously undermines 
the integrity and effectiveness of the federal income tax system1 and creates 
a significant tax revenue gap.2  Some tax practitioners and some prominent 
law and accounting firms have participated in creating and intensifying this 
crisis.3  Yet, more than a century after the enactment of the modern federal 
income tax statute, academics, tax lawyers, and accountants continue to 
debate the appropriate role of the tax practitioner in the tax system.  This 
vigorous discussion has involved many of the leading tax advisers and 
academic commentators of their time.4  Many of these advisers and 
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 1. See, e.g., Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 47, 53 
(2010) (describing the past fifty years as having developed “a culture of tax avoidance”); 
Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:  Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 570 (2006); Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic 
Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 230 (2000); 
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 243 (2002). 
 2. Estimates vary as to the amount of the tax gap, but there is general agreement that 
the gap is large and growing.  One estimate of the individual tax gap for the 2006 taxable 
year was $450 billion. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure 
Initiatives in the Battle Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 499 (2012).  A 
Treasury study estimated the tax gap for the 2001 taxable year as amounting to $345 billion. 
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING 
THE TAX GAP 5 (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES—
LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY (2014) (discussing corporate tax 
shelter abuses and the tax practitioners and law and accounting firms involved in those 
abuses); Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax 
Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267 (2008). 
 4. See Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945–1965:  Patriotism, 
Duties, and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 2–3 (2012) [hereinafter Hatfield, 1945–1965] 
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commentators have maintained that tax professionals owe a special 
professional duty to the tax system as well as to their clients, despite the 
detrimental effect that duty to the system may have on their ability to 
represent their clients with maximum zeal.5  Under this view, because tax 
practitioners serve as intermediaries between the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) and business and high-income taxpayers, their behavior has a 
potentially significant effect on the level of compliance by such taxpayers 
and the level of respect all taxpayers have for the tax system.6  Thus, tax 
practitioner ethics play an important role in the government’s ability to 
collect taxes efficiently7 and, therefore, play an important role in helping 
pay for a civilized society8 and in upholding the democratic social 
 
(discussing this debate during the period from 1945 to 1965); Michael Hatfield, Committee 
Opinions and Treasury Regulation:  Tax Lawyer Ethics, 1965–1985, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 675, 
718–19 (2014) (discussing this debate during the period from 1965 to 1985). 
 5. See, e.g., BERNARD WOLFMAN, DEBORAH H. SCHENK & DIANE RING, ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 1–2 (4th ed. 2008); Mortimer M. Caplin, 
Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor—A Perspective, 40 TAXES 1030, 1032 (1962); Frederic 
G. Corneel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Second, 43 TAX LAW. 297, 301–02 (1990); Michael 
C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1028 
(1987); Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 687–98 
(1997) (book review); Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut:  Surveying Erosion in the 
Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589, 605–07 (2003); Randolph E. Paul, 
The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63 HARV. L. REV. 377, 384–85 (1950); Loren D. 
Prescott, Jr., Challenging the Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 693, 715 (1997); Deborah H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2004 
(1982) (book review); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality:  Rethinking the Professional 
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457–58 (2007); cf. 
William D. Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59 TEX. L. REV. 755, 783–85 (1981); 
William D. Popkin, Standing to Challenge Generous Tax Rulings:  The Case for 
Congressional Action, 6 TAX NOTES 163, 168 (1978) [hereinafter Popkin, Standing]. 
 6. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. & Bradley T. Borden, Probability, Professionalism, 
and Protecting Taxpayers, 68 TAX LAW. 83, 105 (2014) (“[A]ccurate advice and accurate 
returns protect the tax system by raising compliance among taxpayers at all income levels 
and by bolstering fairness, both real and perceived, under the tax laws.”); cf. ROMAN 
TOMASIC & BRENDAN PENTONY, DEFINING ACCEPTABLE TAX CONDUCT:  THE ROLE OF 
PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS IN TAX COMPLIANCE—A PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CRIMINOLOGY 
RESEARCH COUNCIL 1 (1990) (describing the role of tax practitioners in the Australian tax 
system).  The tax practitioner’s attitude can affect taxpayer compliance in a number of ways.  
As one important facet of this effect, if the tax practitioner treats tax laws as lacking 
legitimacy, then her clients’ attitudes toward those laws will be undermined; by contrast, if a 
tax practitioner displays respect for the tax system, then such behavior helps foster respect 
for the tax system by the practitioner’s clients. 
 7. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty:  Will Publicizing Tax 
Information Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95, 95 (2005) (noting that a self-
assessment tax system is an efficient manner of collecting revenue, and arguing that greater 
transparency in tax reporting is necessary to improve tax compliance).  Although we would 
not necessarily recommend the adoption of Professor Kornhauser’s various proposals, we do 
agree that greater tax reporting transparency is a necessary part of solving the tax compliance 
problem.  Also, applying tax withholding obligations to the payors of additional types of 
income would increase tax compliance significantly.  Any detailed discussion of the 
important topics of increased tax reporting transparency and tax withholding are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 8. See Moran Harari Ofer Sitbon & Ronit Donyets-Kedar, Aggressive Tax Planning 
and Corporate Social Responsibility in Israel, 12 J. ACCT. BUS. & PUB. INT. 1, 5 (2013) 
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consensus embodied in the tax system.9  In contrast to these views, other 
tax advisers and academic commentators reject the notion that tax 
professionals owe any such duty to the tax system and argue that a tax 
professional’s sole duty is to represent vigorously his or her clients within 
the bounds of the law.10 
The debate has had numerous facets.  First, a debate within the American 
Bar Association (ABA) ensued over the appropriate standard for 
determining whether an attorney can ethically advise a client to take a 
questionable tax return position, shifting from a “reasonable basis” 
standard11 to a “realistic possibility of success” standard12 and, finally, to a 
“more likely than not” standard with respect to marketed tax shelters.13  
Some commentators argued that a higher standard should be required with 
respect to return positions, even if not related to a tax shelter, such as 
“substantial authority” or “more likely than not,” unless the client 
adequately discloses the position on the return.14  The Treasury and the IRS 
have similarly debated their tax practitioner standards under Circular 230,15 
which applies to both lawyers and accountants who practice before the IRS 
and, over the years, those standards have shifted from a “reasonable basis” 
standard to a “more likely than not” standard to a “substantial authority” 
 
(“Tax payment is the main source for financing the state budget that the elected government 
uses to carry out national priorities.”). 
 9. See id. at 6 (“Tax collection is one of the pillars of democracy, being the result of a 
broad social consensus regarding the participation of individuals in the funding and 
allocation of the resources needed for the welfare of society as a whole.”).  In essence, in a 
self-assessment system, the government looks to tax practitioners to help support tax law 
enforcement. See, e.g., Yuka Sakurai & Valerie Braithwaite, Taxpayers’ Perceptions of 
Practitioners:  Finding One Who Is Effective and Does the Right Thing?, 46 J. BUS. ETHICS 
375, 375–76 (2003) (studying Australian taxpayers). 
 10. See, e.g., David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided:  Duties to Clients and Duties to 
Others—the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to 
the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 170 (2009) (arguing, in part, that imposing a duty to the tax 
system on tax lawyers is inconsistent with our adversarial legal system established by the 
Constitution); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the 
System, 47 KAN. L. REV. 847, 851, 871, 909 (1999) (stating that tax lawyers owe no duty to 
the tax system or society in general); see also Simon, supra note 5, at 1457–58 (noting that a 
substantial segment of the tax bar are “formalists” who do not accept the applicability of a 
tax professional’s duty to the system). 
 11. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965). 
 12. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985). 
 13. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) (revised). 
 14. See, e.g., Matthew C. Ames, Note, Formal Opinion 352:  Professional Integrity and 
the Tax Audit Lottery, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 423–25 (1987) (arguing that ABA 
Opinion 352 does nothing to stop the audit lottery and tax lawyers’ participation in it).  The 
ABA Section of Taxation has long played an important role in the development of ethical 
standards for tax lawyers. See, e.g., Phillip L. Mann, A Brief History of the Tax Section, 
1939–2014, 68 TAX LAW. 13, 15 (2014). 
 15. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, CIRCULAR NO. 230, REGULATIONS GOVERNING PRACTICE 
BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (rev. 2014) [hereinafter CIRCULAR 230].  The 
original version of Circular 230 was published in 1921. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, 
CIRCULAR NO. 230, LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE RECOGNITION OF ATTORNEYS 
AND AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS REPRESENTING CLAIMANTS BEFORE THE TREASURY 
DEPARTMENT (1921).  The statutory authority for Circular 230 regulation is in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 330(a), first enacted in 1884. 
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standard in non-tax shelter situations where the client does not adequately 
disclose the position on the return.16  The Circular 230 changes mirrored 
congressional changes in the standard for imposing understatement 
penalties on tax preparers under section 6694(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code17 (“the Code”).  Tax professionals writing tax opinions without 
sufficient inquiry into the factual details underlying the clients’ transactions 
provoked changes to Circular 230, including particularized and complex 
rules on “covered opinions,” which were substantially scaled back in 
2014.18  An era of tax shelter abuses involving individual taxpayers resulted 
in the increasing application of judicial doctrines to counteract tax abuse, 
congressional tax reform legislation,19 new penalties for taxpayers and tax 
professionals, and, as already mentioned, new standards for tax 
practitioners in opinion writing.20  Despite this wave of increased regulation 
of tax-motivated transactions and tax professionals, a decade later tax 
lawyers and accountants became involved in the marketing of a different 
kind of abusive tax shelters to corporate taxpayers.21  This led to a wave of 
criminal and civil enforcement actions against taxpayers and the firms and 
tax professionals who advised taxpayers with respect to these 
transactions.22  The involvement of prestigious law and accounting firms 
and tax professionals in the corporate tax shelter abuses, and in other overly 
aggressive tax planning strategies, has been properly viewed as reflecting a 
decline in tax adviser professionalism23 and as raising serious questions 
 
 16. CIRCULAR 230, supra note 15, § 10.34(a)(1) (referring to an “unreasonable position” 
under section 6694(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which uses a “substantial authority” 
standard for undisclosed return positions not related to tax shelters or reportable 
transactions).  If the return position is disclosed on the taxpayer’s return and does not relate 
to a tax shelter or reportable transaction, the tax practitioner need only have a “reasonable 
basis” for the position under the current version of Circular 230. Id.  If the return position 
relates to a tax shelter or reportable transaction, it must be reasonable for the tax practitioner 
to believe that it is more likely than not that the return position will be sustained on its 
merits, without regard to whether it is disclosed. Id. 
 17. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2012) (prescribing penalties for understatement of a taxpayer’s 
liability by a tax preparer due to an “unreasonable position” taken on the taxpayer’s return). 
 18. See Ventry & Borden, supra note 6, at 110–11.  The 2014 amendments to Circular 
230 eliminated the complex “covered opinions” rules in former section 10.35. Id. 
 19. See generally Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss 
Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
 20. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 40–43; Richard Lavoie, Am I My 
Brother’s Keeper?  A Tax Law Perspective on the Challenge of Balancing Gatekeeping 
Obligations and Zealous Advocacy in the Legal Profession, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 813, 834–
36 (2013). 
 21. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 45–73; Susan Cleary Morse, The How 
and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 961, 994–97 (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 273–324; Morse, supra note 21, at 
986–91, 997–1000. 
 23. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 70–73 (discussing the decline in tax 
lawyer professionalism); Infanti, supra note 5, at 591–92, 608–13 (discussing corporate 
inversions and an estate/gift tax-avoidance scheme involving life insurance as evidencing the 
decline in tax lawyer professionalism). 
2016] THE DECLINE IN TAX ADVISER PROFESSIONALISM 2725 
about the level of moral reasoning of tax practitioners.24  These events have 
reinvigorated the debate over the proper role of tax professionals in 
American society and what can be done to remedy this professionalism 
decline. 
In Part I, this Article briefly examines the debate over the proper role of 
the tax professional in representing clients.25  Part II discusses whether tax 
professionals owe special duties to the tax system.  Part III analyzes how 
the tax professionals’ involvement in several waves of tax shelter abuses is 
in sharp contrast to the high-minded rhetoric of the tax ethics debate.  This 
part also discusses changes in the legal and accounting professions that 
have contributed to the current state of taxpayer representation.  This 
Article advocates for the position that tax professionals owe a duty to the 
tax system and such a duty must be grounded in concrete guidance.  Part IV 
proposes several changes that would delineate more clearly the tax 
professionals’ duty to the system while preserving the professionals’ duty 
and right to vigorously represent their clients within the bounds of the law.  
We believe that the Circular 230 standards of practice, the preparer tax 
penalty provisions in section 6694 of the Code, and the taxpayer substantial 
understatement penalty provisions in section 6662 should be harmonized to 
require that the advice of tax professionals to taxpayers with respect to tax 
return positions meet the “more likely than not” standard, except, in the 
case of non-tax shelter transactions, when the taxpayer discloses the 
position on the return.  Disclosed positions should be required to meet an 
enhanced “reasonable basis” standard. 
I.  SPECIAL DUTIES OF TAX PROFESSIONALS 
During the formative years of the modern federal income tax system, tax 
practitioners and scholars engaged in a policy debate that elevated concerns 
about tax practitioner ethics to a philosophical dialogue.26  This debate 
examined the proper role of tax advisers in a voluntary, self-assessment tax 
system that was enacted through democratic processes and that presumably 
reflects the democratic values of American society.  The involvement of 
leading tax professionals in such a high-level philosophical debate stands in 
sharp contrast to the ethical debates that took place more generally in the 
legal profession during these years.  During this time, the organized bar was 
having great difficulty in its efforts to recodify the 1908 Canons of 
 
 24. See, e.g., Elaine Doyle, Jane Frecknall Hughes & Barbara Summers, An Empirical 
Analysis of the Ethical Reasoning of Tax Practitioners, 114 J. BUS. ETHICS 325 (2013) 
(discussing an empirical study showing that the moral reasoning of tax practitioners in the 
tax-dilemma context is significantly lower than that used in the social context). 
 25. Our discussion about the appropriate role of the tax practitioner vis-à-vis the tax 
system encompasses tax advice provided to clients in its various forms, including tax 
planning, tax return preparation, and tax opinions issued to support a client’s transaction.  
Given space and time constraints, however, we do not focus on the specialized requirements 
applicable to tax opinions, including those in Circular 230. See, e.g., CIRCULAR 230, supra 
note 15, § 10.37. 
 26. See Hatfield, 1945–1965, supra note 4, at 8–11. 
2726 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Professional Ethics.27  Such efforts were unsuccessful until the late 1960s, 
when the ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility.28  In the latter efforts, parochial concerns of the legal 
profession often dominated the debate,29 and the role of the lawyer as a 
zealous advocate and nothing more seemed to be the central focus of the 
ethics code commentators.30 
Tax professionals recognized that ethics were important and that 
development of ethical standards for tax professionals was important to the 
proper functioning of our self-assessment tax system.31  The importance of 
our tax system in a post-World War II economy burdened by the Cold War 
environment was evident.32  In addition, the need for the United States to be 
prepared for another major armed conflict played a role in shaping 
sentiment toward professional ethics.33  In part, tax lawyers may have 
viewed this dialogue as central to raising the status of the tax bar as major 
participants, along with other transactional lawyers, in the development of 
the modern legal ethics codes and reducing the influence of litigators who 
had dominated the development of legal ethics codes up to that point.34 
The debate over the responsibilities of a tax professional focuses on 
whether tax is different from other areas of practice.  Some adopt the view 
that tax is different because the special nature of the government as an 
opponent creates a dual duty.  In other words, a tax professional owes an 
obligation to represent the client but also owes an obligation to the 
government as the collector of revenue in the tax system.  Tax was one of 
the first areas where a significant segment of professionals argued they 
owed duties to the system (i.e., in effect to the regulators) as well as to their 
clients.  Subsequent developments in banking and securities law brought 
 
 27. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908); see Edward L. Wright, The Code 
of Professional Responsibility:  Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1970) 
(describing difficulties the organized bar encountered in recodifying the 1908 Canons). 
 28. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969). See generally John 
F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility:  An 
Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970) [hereinafter Sutton, Jr., The American Bar 
Association] (discussing the history of the ABA’s promulgation of the 1969 Model Code); 
John F. Sutton, Jr., Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics:  A Reviser’s 
Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132 (1966) [hereinafter Sutton, Jr., Re-Evaluation] (discussing 
problems with the 1909 Canons as a legal ethics code and considerations that should be 
taken into account in drafting an appropriate legal ethics code). 
 29. Cf. John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 
42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 61–62 (2013). 
 30. Cf. id.  Despite these pressures, the 1969 Model Code drafters produced a set of 
ethical rules that were a substantial improvement over the predecessor ABA Canons. See, 
e.g., id. at  62; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 
1251–52 (1991) (discussing the organized bar’s movement from the 1908 Canons to the 
1969 Model Code as a significant transformation of ethical norms); cf. Sutton, Jr., Re-
Evaluation, supra note 28 (discussing the failure of the 1909 Canons as a legal ethics code). 
 31. Hatfield, 1945–1965, supra note 4, at 15–18. 
 32. Id. at 12–14 (discussing the Cold War environment and its effect on the development 
of tax ethics). 
 33. Id. at 11–15, 19 (discussing “patriotism” as playing an important role in discussions 
of tax ethics). 
 34. See Dzienkowski, supra note 29, at 62. 
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similar arguments in those areas.  The early debate did not characterize the 
professional as the gatekeeper; instead, the view was that tax lawyers and 
accountants had a dual role to represent clients within the bounds of the law 
in light of an obligation to the tax system. 
The decision by the Treasury and the IRS to permit a range of 
professionals to offer tax services led the Treasury to promulgate the 
modern version of Circular 230 in 1966.  Tax advice could be provided to 
clients by tax lawyers, tax accountants, and enrolled agents.35  Tax returns 
could be prepared by nonlawyers.  The preemption of unauthorized practice 
of law rules by the federal system gave the Treasury a greater incentive to 
monitor the behavior of tax professionals.  And, in turn, lawyers were 
pushed to differentiate their services both in terms of quality and 
reputational value.  Therefore, if lawyers could offer clients services that 
were more respected by the tax authorities than the other professionals, it 
would give lawyers an advantage in the highly competitive marketplace for 
tax services. 
The promulgation of Circular 230 as a code for regulating tax 
practitioners’ conduct essentially federalized the regulation of the 
professional conduct of tax advisers.  Despite the claims for self-regulation 
of lawyers practicing tax law and arguments that tax practice is similar to 
all other law practice, the federal government has chosen to regulate the 
conduct of tax professionals, including tax lawyers, for decades.  This 
federal regulation is in addition to state bar regulation of lawyers and the 
state regulation of other tax professionals, such as accountants.  Circular 
230 obligates all tax practitioners to exercise due diligence in the 
preparation and filing of all documents with the IRS.  That duty requires 
practitioners to verify the accuracy of all statements made to the 
government.  Thus, going back to 1966, tax professionals have had a duty 
similar to those owed to tribunals in the codes of ethics. 
The creation of a dual duty to the client and the Treasury presents 
significant difficulties because our system of taxation gives the government 
a multiplicity of roles.  First, the Treasury and the IRS interpret 
congressional statutes by proposing and adopting regulations under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.36  Second, the IRS issues published- and 
private-letter rulings and other forms of administrative guidance 
interpreting the application of the tax laws to specific fact patterns.  The 
IRS has the responsibility for collecting revenue and for auditing taxpayers 
to determine compliance with the tax laws.  The IRS also, in conjunction 
with the Justice Department, conducts litigation in the administrative 
appeals and federal trial and appellate courts.  This multiplicity of roles 
makes the analogy of a duty to a tribunal more complicated and in fact 
serves as the basis for the argument that tax professionals should have little 
or no duty to the government.  In a sense, the Treasury and the IRS are both 
 
 35. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
American Legal Profession:  A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal 
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 106–12 (2000). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 79-404 (1946). 
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potential adversaries of taxpayers and a quasi-tribunal; therefore, the 
traditional arguments of a duty to the tribunal are not completely applicable, 
without some appropriate modification. 
The debate over whether tax professionals have a dual role has two more 
practical applications in the representation of clients.37  First, should the 
traditional role of representing clients zealously be tempered somewhat 
because of this obligation?  Second, scholars and lawyers have questioned 
whether tax advisers should have a duty of broader disclosure to the 
government. 
Tax professionals have an obligation to represent their clients zealously 
within the bounds of the law.  In other words, no one suggests that a tax 
adviser should advise clients to falsify documents or backdate documents 
that have tax effect.  In 1965, the ABA, in Ethics Opinion 314, 
conceptualized the filing of a tax return as falling into the category of an 
adversarial proceeding and, therefore, opined that a lawyer may advise the 
client to take a position on the return without disclosure to the IRS if the 
position is supported by a reasonable basis.38  The “reasonable basis” 
standard was viewed as a relatively low one that encouraged taxpayers to 
exploit the lack of audit enforcement for the vast majority of tax returns.39  
In the 1980s, the ABA Section of Taxation, after careful study, sought to 
change the guidance provided in Opinion 314 to require a meritorious basis 
for advice given to taxpayers—a position that would not permit tax advisers 
to exploit the audit selection process in preparing information for reliance 
by taxpayers.40  It also sought to clarify that advice in the context of tax 
return preparation is not an adversarial proceeding.41  In 1985, the ABA, in 
Ethics Opinion 352, changed the standard from reasonable basis to a good 
faith belief that the position was warranted in existing law or supported by a 
good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
which incorporates language used in the Model Rules provision dealing 
with frivolous filings as a disciplinary violation.42  Under this opinion, to be 
in good faith, there must be a realistic possibility of success of the position 
being sustained if the position is challenged in litigation.43 
In light of the problems created by taxpayer reliance on advice grounded 
in only a reasonable basis for taking a return position, Congress modified 
the Code to increase the penalties on taxpayers taking questionable return 
positions.  Under section 6662, a taxpayer who files a return with a 
 
 37. Professor Fred Zacharias characterized this issue in taxation as creating a secondary 
obligation to a nonclient, in this case the Treasury. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing 
Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 185 (1997) (defining the duty as “prohibiting the 
lawyer to counsel noncompliance with regulations, but allowing her to help a client 
maximize legal deductions”). 
 38. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965). 
 39. See, e.g., Ames, supra note 14, at 412 (defining and discussing the audit lottery); 
Discussion on “Questionable Positions”—Meeting of ABA Section of Taxation, 32 TAX 
LAW. 13, 20 (1978) (remarks by then-IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz). 
 40. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985). 
 41. Id. 
 42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 43. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 352. 
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substantial understatement of tax liability will be subject to a penalty unless 
the taxpayer had substantial authority for the return position or, if the 
authority was less than substantial, if the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for 
the position and disclosed it on the tax return.44  The regulations 
specifically reject the taxpayer’s reliance on the audit lottery to avoid the 
substantial understatement penalty.45  Under section 6662,46 if the taxpayer 
is involved in a transaction that constitutes a tax shelter, the substantial 
understatement penalty will be imposed without regard to disclosure and 
without regard to the level of authority for the taxpayer’s return position. 
Effectively, Congress has used the penalties and disclosure system to 
raise the standards of tax professionals and establish a standard of care for 
tax professionals.  Because professionals seek to ensure that their clients are 
not penalized for tax return provisions based on their tax advice, they must 
seek to support their positions with substantial authority or must encourage 
their clients to disclose the positions on their tax returns. 
II.  TAX SHELTER ABUSES:  THE DIVERGENCE 
OF ETHICS RHETORIC FROM PRACTICE REALITY 
Despite the rhetoric from elite tax professionals about the need to 
maintain high ethical standards in tax practice, tax professionals and their 
taxpayer clients have been involved in at least two major waves of tax 
shelter abuses.  Each of these tax shelter episodes involved many tax 
professionals aiding their clients to avoid significant tax liability in 
transactions having questionable validity.47  And each led to significant 
litigation by the government seeking to invalidate the transactions using 
judicial doctrines such as the economic substance doctrine, a congressional 
 
 44. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(2), (d) (2012).  The substantial understatement penalty was 
formerly in section 6661 before its repeal by Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721 (1989). 
 45. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2012) (“The possibility that a return will not be 
audited or, if audited, that an item will not be raised on audit, is not relevant in determining 
whether the substantial authority standard (or the reasonable basis standard) is satisfied.”). 
 46. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(2), (d)(2)(C).  Before Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812(d) (2004) 
amended section 6662, noncorporate taxpayers could avoid the substantial understatement 
penalty with respect to a tax shelter item if they reasonably believed that it was more likely 
than not that the taxpayer’s treatment of the item on the return was the proper tax treatment. 
I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2004).  Under this prior version of section 6662, the substantial 
understatement penalty applied to tax shelter items of corporate taxpayers without regard to 
disclosure or the level of authority for the corporate taxpayer’s return position. Id. 
 47. There is an ongoing debate concerning whether tax professionals lead taxpayers into 
greater noncompliance or whether they are merely service providers responding to the 
demand of their clients for tax minimization. See Sakurai & Braithwaite, supra note 9, at 
376; see also Don R. Hansen, Rick L. Crosser & Doug Laufer, Moral Ethics V. Tax Ethics:  
The Case of Transfer Pricing Among Multinational Corporations, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 679 
(1992).  For example, some research suggests that taxpayers generally do not prefer 
aggressive tax advice and that tax practitioners who market such advice may be doing so 
independent of their clients’ desires and based on a misinterpretation of what their clients 
want. See Peggy A. Hite & Gary A. McGill, An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for 
Aggressive Tax Advice, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 389, 399 (1992).  In any event, in both waves of tax 
shelter transactions, tax practitioners played a major role in the proliferation of these abusive 
transactions, whether or not they were responding to client demand for such tax-
minimization products. 
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response in the form of new statutory provisions seeking to eliminate such 
transactions, and new and revised penalties on taxpayers and preparers. 
The first wave of tax shelters began in the 1960s, proliferated in the 
1970s, and lasted until the mid-1980s.48  These tax shelters were primarily 
targeted at individual taxpayers and involved tax professionals who 
encouraged their clients to enter into transactions, often involving 
depreciable real estate or equipment, that generated large tax losses and 
were primarily motivated to obtain tax benefits and not economic gain.49  
These shelters often involved purchase-money nonrecourse debt and 
overstatements of the value of the underlying properties.50  They were 
designed by tax professionals and presented to their clients as ways to 
minimize tax liability, with the professionals supplying tax opinions 
supporting the validity of the transactions.51 
The reform to remedy the first wave of tax shelters began in the courts 
and involved the assertion of the substance over form, step transaction, and 
sham transaction doctrines.52  The first wave of tax shelters exposed serious 
weaknesses in the Code’s structure, which allowed high-income taxpayers 
to claim depreciation and other deductions supported by nonrecourse debt 
and use the resulting noneconomic investment losses to offset income from 
services and portfolio investments.53  Congress enacted at-risk limitations 
on the deductions from nonrecourse debt and the passive activity loss rules 
that prevent the use of passive losses from activities in which the taxpayer 
does not materially participate to offset income from services or other 
active trades or businesses or from portfolio investments.54  Congress also 
enacted new and revised penalty provisions directed at taxpayers, tax 
advisers, and tax preparers participating in these transactions.55  Although 
these remedies were successful in shutting down the individual tax shelters 
at which these rules were aimed, they did not prevent the next wave of tax 
shelters from emerging. 
The second wave of tax shelters began in the late 1990s and continued 
into the 2000s.56  It involved a desire by corporations and wealthy 
individuals to save taxes and seek advice from professionals that focused 
upon tax minimization, and eventually it led to the active marketing by tax 
professionals to corporations and wealthy individuals of tax shelters based 
 
 48. See Lavoie, supra note 20, at 832–37. 
 49. See Peroni, supra note 19, at 7–11. 
 50. See, e.g., Theodore S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a 
Teakettle:  Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263, 268–71, 356–63 (1994). 
 51. See Lavoie, supra note 20, at 832–38. 
 52. The economic substance doctrine eventually was codified in 2010 in section 
7701(o), accompanied by enactment of a 40 percent strict liability penalty for tax 
understatements attributable to nondisclosed, non-economic substance transactions in 
sections 6662(b)(6) and (i). Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-152, §§ 1409(a), (b)(1), (2) (adding sections 6662(b)(6), 6662(i), and 7701(o) to the 
Internal Revenue Code). 
 53. See Peroni, supra note 19, at 20–61. 
 54. See I.R.C. §§ 465, 469 (2012); Peroni, supra note 19, at 20–61. 
 55. See Lavoie, supra note 20, at 835–36. 
 56. See id. at 838. 
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on exploitation of narrow loopholes in the tax law.57  Large accounting 
firms and law firms developed these shelters and sold them as “products” to 
large numbers of taxpayers through confidential memorandums.58  The tax 
professionals sold these products under fee arrangements that allowed them 
to collect a portion of the tax savings obtained by their clients’ use of the 
shelters.59 
Some of the pressure for tax savings came from corporations that viewed 
taxes as a cost center and from wealthy individuals who sought relief from 
progressive tax rates.  However, a key feature to the second wave of tax 
shelters was the role of the tax professionals.  Lawyers and accountants in 
large firm structures viewed the marketing of tax-minimization products as 
part of their tax adviser role.60  This resulted from the commoditization of 
tax practice into the sale of tax-minimization structures that were adapted 
for corporate and wealthy individual taxpayers and from the pressures 
arising from changes in the accounting and legal professions.61 
Structural changes in the practices of professionals in the modern global 
economy unquestionably have had an effect upon tax professionals’ 
attitudes toward taxpayer compliance with the law.  The shift in legal 
services from relational to transactional work had significant implications 
for the legal profession.  Corporate clients relied upon lawyers to structure 
deals and to address the tax consequences of deals, and this changed the 
nature of the advice that lawyers gave to clients.  Since the 1980s, the Big 
Eight accounting firms have been reduced to four due to merger and 
dissolution.62  Accounting firms in the 1990s became involved in the 
delivery of multidisciplinary (MDP) services throughout the world, and 
such firms sought to offer legal services in the United States.63  Despite the 
ABA’s rejection of the MDP movement in 1999 and 2000,64 accounting 
firms increased services in federal income taxation, the one area of law that 
 
 57. See generally Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers:  The Organized Tax Bar and the 
Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. REG. 77 (2006). 
 58. See Lavoie, supra note 20, at 838 (noting that the 1990s tax shelters were 
confidentially marketed as templates to corporate and wealthy taxpayers). 
 59. See Ben Wang, Note, Supplying the Tax Shelter Industry:  Contingent Fee 
Compensation for Accountants Spur Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1260–62 (2003) 
(examining the role of accounting firms in the growth of the corporate tax shelter industry 
and the extent to which the firms’ use of contingent fees contributed to that growth). 
 60. See Jared T. Meier, Comment, Understanding the Statutory Tax Practitioner 
Privilege:  What Is Tax Shelter “Promotion”?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (2011). 
 61. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 202–06 (discussing the marketing of 
tax shelters to wealthy individuals and corporations). See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, 
THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 23–25 (2010) (discussing the commodification of law 
practice and its effect on the professionalism ideal). 
 62. See generally Mary W. Sullivan, The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm 
Mergers on the Market for Audit Services, 45 J.L. & ECON. 375 (2002) (discussing whether 
the Big Eight accounting firm mergers were anticompetitive or efficiency enhancing). 
 63. See Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs:  Context, History, and Process, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1635–48 (2000) (discussing the role of the then-Big Five accounting 
firms in the debate over multidisciplinary practice). 
 64. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 35, at 86–87, 88, 104, 106–07. 
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was available because of federal preemption.65  This expansion of tax-
related services involved the hiring of many tax lawyers and the promise of 
significant compensation to these professionals.66  As economic pressures 
increased upon accounting firms to generate more income, some of them 
began to offer aggressive tax shelter products to their clients, which 
provided them with substantial fees based upon tax savings.67 
As accounting firms moved into direct competition with law firms in the 
United States and around the world, lawyers were facing significant 
economic pressures from dramatic changes in the legal profession.68  Until 
the mid-2000s, law firms were growing in size despite the economic 
challenges from the various corporate financial scandals, the housing crisis 
and related problems in the banking and mortgage loan industries, and the 
scandals involving derivatives trading and other financial products.69  Such 
growth placed significant pressures upon the various departments to 
produce increased revenue.70  Changes in client demand for legal services 
also had a significant impact upon law firm business.  As corporations 
brought more work in house into growing departments of lawyer 
employees,71 they pressured law firms to limit fees and costs.72  These 
efforts brought outsourcing and a greater involvement of nonlawyers into 
the delivery of legal services.73 
These structural changes contributed to the involvement of several 
accounting and law firm professionals in marketing tax shelters to 
corporations and wealthy individual clients.  The accounting firm KPMG 
played a central role in the marketing of tax shelters to its clients, 
generating over $100 million in professional fees and imposing billions of 
dollars of illegitimate deductions upon the tax system.74  Several other 
major accounting firms, including Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and BDO Seidman, were involved in similar 
efforts to market tax shelters to their clients.75  As the accounting firms 
were marketing products to their clients, law firms similarly became 
 
 65. See id. at 106–07 (discussing the expansion of tax services by the large accounting 
firms in the United States and throughout the world). 
 66. See Rostain, supra note 57, at 79 (citing Susan Beck, The Trojan Accountant, AM. 
LAW., Nov. 1999, at 18). 
 67. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 56–57; Rostain, supra note 57, at 88–
92; Wang, supra note 59, at 1260–62. 
 68. See MORGAN, supra note 61, at 71–72. 
 69. See Eli Wald, Foreword:  The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2051 (2010). 
 70. See TERRENCE E. SIMON, A GUIDE TO ETHICAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES TAX 
INDUSTRY 12 (2013) (discussing increased competition leading to the development of 
marketing practices to increase business). 
 71. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 760. 
 72. See generally Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament:  A 
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008) (examining 
factors that contribute to change in Big Law practice). 
 73. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law:  Alternative Legal Service 
Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 3000–01 (2014). 
 74. See ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 131. 
 75. See id. at 133–74. 
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involved in the tax shelter industry.  The law firm of Jenkins & Gilchrist 
through mergers expanded dramatically and played a central role in 
lawyering these deals.76  Other law firms, including Brown & Wood, Locke 
Liddell, Sidley Austin, and Arnold & Porter, were alleged to have been 
involved in writing opinion letters for these deals.77  In 2001, the 
government announced a voluntary disclosure program for taxpayers to 
avoid penalties.78  Those efforts, in turn, led to subpoenas and summonses 
to the accounting and law firms to discover all of the clients who had 
invested in the ventures.79  In the end, the government obtained some 
substantial civil settlements and criminal indictments in these cases.80  And, 
as the government sought to collect the taxes from clients, the clients 
brought malpractice cases against the lawyers and the accountants to 
recover the amounts paid to the IRS.81  The important point here is that 
some leading tax professionals and the firms that employ them were the 
driving force behind very serious abuses of the tax system. 
The two rounds of tax professional involvement in tax shelters arose in 
the context of advisers adopting an aggressively adversarial posture with 
respect to the tax system.  Of course, professionals sought personal gain 
through the marketing of tax shelters, but they did so by seeking to take 
advantage of a tax system that was not prepared to discover these products.  
These tax professionals took the view that a tax return filing is an 
adversarial proceeding that requires only a low threshold of a nonfrivolous 
argument to support a taxpayer’s return position.  In a self-assessment 
system, the taxpayer is in a superior position vis-à-vis the government in 
terms of knowledge about the transaction, control over what to disclose, and 
realizing the low likelihood of government audit.82  By commoditizing the 
tax shelters and selling them as products to many taxpayers, tax 
professionals multiplied substantially the revenue losses to the government.  
The involvement of accounting and law firms in the marketing of these 
products demonstrates that this was more than an isolated incident by a 
handful of professionals.  These acts were done deliberately and 
purposefully despite the slim authority upon which these transactions were 
based. 
Aside from the structural changes in accounting and law firms, the norms 
adopted by tax professionals must be examined in the context of the 
evolution of U.S. culture.  Post-World War II patriotism and attitudes 
toward the government were undermined by the Vietnam War, Watergate, 
and numerous other scandals.  One of the dominant issues in U.S. political 
discourse over the last sixty-five years has been the appropriate level of 
 
 76. See id. at 177–216. 
 77. See id. at 218–39. 
 78. See id. at 272–73. 
 79. See id. at 273–77. 
 80. See id. at 295, 309–24, 327–29. 
 81. See, e.g., Soled, supra note 3, at 273–74. 
 82. See Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System:  Unfettering 
Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407, 411 (2008). 
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federal income taxes.83  And, the rise of the Tea Party as a wing of the 
Republican Party has accentuated anti-taxation sentiments in the political 
debate.  Instead of a debate over the merits of specific tax provisions and 
their policy implications, the rhetoric often has involved attacks on the 
integrity of the IRS.  Those attacks have found their way into congressional 
hearings.  Any misstep by the IRS often leads to significant negative 
publicity that undermines confidence in the tax system.  The negative 
attitude toward the tax system and its collection agency has an effect upon 
tax professionals’ ethics and taxpayer compliance.  Attacks on legitimacy 
provide professionals and taxpayers with justifications, albeit improper, to 
take overly aggressive positions on tax returns.  These attitudes also tie into 
the view that the tax return filing is an adversarial proceeding. 
The two rounds of tax shelter abuses show us that a significant number of 
tax professionals do not view overly aggressive tax avoidance as a breach of 
a taxpayer’s social contract with the government and are all too willing to 
assist their clients in achieving that breach.84  Taxpayers benefit from the 
services that government provides to all of society.  Taxes help implement 
our constitutional system of government with the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches.  Government provides a system of laws and implements 
processes in which the civil and criminal laws are enforced.  Taxes fund the 
military that is responsible for protecting the country’s citizens and 
residents from enemy forces.85  Without the government funding provided 
by taxation, fundamental aspects of government that help facilitate trade—
such as market regulation, transportation, energy security, and import and 
export requirements—would not exist.  Taxes fund public welfare systems 
for retirement, health care, and unemployment.  When taxpayers choose to 
underpay their tax obligations, the revenue shortfall must be made up by 
other taxpayers.  Although in a democratic society disputes of course will 
exist as to the proper size of government, those disputes should be resolved 
democratically through the give and take of the political process, not 
through actions by high-income corporations and individuals to underpay 
their tax obligations through overly aggressive tax planning.  In a sense, 
 
 83. See generally Andrea Louise Campbell, Tax Attitudes in the Obama Era, 67 TAX L. 
REV. 647 (2014) (discussing the U.S. public’s varying attitudes toward federal individual 
income taxes over the past eighty years). 
 84. Professor Tanina Rostain’s insightful work points out that elite tax lawyers rallied 
behind the efforts to limit aggressive tax shelters and to punish those professionals who were 
involved in the second wave of tax shelters. See Rostain, supra note 57, at 94–113.  She 
opines that although such acts were seemingly against the short-term economic interest of 
tax professionals, the elite lawyers sought to regain control over professional self-regulation 
and to reestablish reputational capital that had been lost during this era. Id. at 105–06, 108–
09, 118–19. 
 85. See, e.g., Popkin, Standing, supra note 5, at 168 (“The argument for a special 
judicial concern with tax equity is that tax obligations are, with the possible exception of 
military service, the most fundamental duty a member of a polity bears to the political 
community.”). 
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when taxpayers choose to underpay their tax obligations to the government, 
they are acting in an undemocratic manner.86 
For corporate taxpayers, compliance with tax laws raises both a 
fundamental aspect of corporate social responsibility87 and an aspect of 
fairness in competition.  Corporations who adopt overly aggressive 
positions to minimize taxes can be viewed as not contributing their fair 
share of paying the costs of government.  This is especially true because 
government provides corporate actors with significant benefits, such as 
limited liability and support for the public equity markets, which allow 
corporations to raise large amounts of capital from unrelated investors.  In 
recent years, corporations have sought to embrace the concepts of the good 
corporate citizen and social responsibility.  Such statements appear in 
annual reports, appear as part of advertising campaigns, and are made in the 
context of corporate accidents and other mass torts and environmental 
issues.88  Corporate social responsibility often has focused upon saving the 
environment or providing workers with fair labor conditions, but 
corporations almost never boast about paying their fair share of taxes.  If a 
corporation seeks to act in a socially responsible manner, such actions 
should lead it to reject the adoption of overly aggressive tax positions.  As 
persuasively argued by some commentators, corporate social responsibility 
should include good faith compliance with the tax laws.89  Stated 
differently, a corporation’s participation in aggressive tax planning is 
inconsistent with claims of corporate social responsibility.  In addition, 
corporations that significantly understate their tax liability through overly 
aggressive tax positions may obtain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their 
competitors who do not engage in such behavior because they may be able 
to charge lower prices for their products or services or, alternatively, realize 
larger after-tax profits. 
In the United States, political attacks on the tax system90 and the IRS91—
the administrative agency in charge of collecting taxes—have undercut 
 
 86. See, e.g., Harari, Sitbon & Donyets-Kedar, supra note 8, at 17; cf. Popkin, Standing, 
supra note 5, at 168. 
 87. See William E. Shafer & Richard S. Simmons, Social Responsibility, 
Machiavellianism, and Tax Avoidance, 21 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 695 
(2008). 
 88. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1207, 1222 (2002) (citing Christopher Cooper, Kyoto Pact Offers Opportunities to Crow, 
WALL STREET J., Nov. 1, 2001, at A14, which discusses Royal Dutch Shell’s and BP-
Amoco’s disclosures of their environmental and other social responsibility efforts in their 
annual reports); Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit:  Rethinking 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 983, 999–1009 (2011) (discussing BP’s advertising campaign after the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill). 
 89. See, e.g., Harari, Sitbon & Donyets-Kedar, supra note 8, at 17–21 (arguing that 
aggressive tax planning is incompatible with corporate social responsibility). 
 90. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 13–16 (describing the anti-tax 
crusade). 
 91. See, e.g., Ordower, supra note 1, at 119–20 (describing the “demonization” of the 
IRS as having become “a commonplace rhetorical device for members of Congress”).  
Political attacks on the IRS may have a chilling effect on enforcement by the IRS. See Lily 
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taxpayer respect for the tax system.  Tax professionals engaging in abusive 
and highly publicized tax-avoidance schemes has further eroded taxpayer 
respect for the tax system.  These actions in turn have frayed the social 
norm supporting the payment of taxes as part of one’s obligations as a 
member of society, a social norm that is crucial to sustaining a self-
assessment tax system in a democratic society.  Lack of belief in social and 
corporate responsibility may result in more participation by tax 
professionals in overly aggressive tax planning.92  Although such cultural 
attitudes are difficult to change through any type of regulation, particularly 
in a country with broad First Amendment protections, it is vital that we try 
to do something to increase the level of tax practitioner ethics.93 
It is important to recognize that cultural differences among different 
societies may affect attitudes by tax professionals and taxpayers regarding 
tax ethics and the propriety of aggressive tax planning.94  Thus, in some 
other countries, the attitudes of citizens toward the government and its 
revenue collection system are consistent with respect for, and recognition 
of, the obligation to pay taxes as an important societal obligation.95  
Because other countries with collectivistic tendencies may have broader 
social programs, and such programs are necessarily funded by revenue 
 
Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, in ETHICAL DUTIES 
TO THE TAX SYSTEM:  A HANDBOOK 123, 133 (Scott A. Schumacher & Michael Hatfield eds., 
2015).  Moreover, in our view, tax practitioners who engage in unsubstantiated attacks on 
the IRS are acting in an unprofessional manner and harming tax compliance by unfairly 
undercutting respect for the federal tax collection agency. 
 92. For example, one study of Hong Kong tax professionals showed that a lack of belief 
by such professionals in social and corporate responsibility was likely to facilitate overly 
aggressive corporate tax planning. See Shafer & Simmons, supra note 87, at 698 (concluding 
that “attitudes toward corporate ethics and social responsibility will have a significant impact 
on the ethical decision-making processes of tax professionals”); cf. Dipankar Ghosh & Terry 
L. Crain, Ethical Standards, Attitudes Toward Risk, and Intentional Noncompliance:  An 
Experimental Investigation, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 353, 358–59 (1995) (study finding that 
taxpayers with lower ethical standards are more likely to engage in intentional tax 
noncompliance).  Research in the business ethics area supports the theory that attitudes 
toward the importance of corporate ethics and social responsibility have an important effect 
on ethical decision-making processes.  See, e.g., John M. Etheredge, The Perceived Role of 
Ethics and Social Responsibility:  An Alternative Scale Structure, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 51, 60–
61 (1999); Shafer & Simmons, supra note 87, at 697–98; Anusorn Singhapakdi, Karan 
Karande, C.P. Rao & Scott J. Vitell, How Important Are Ethics and Social Responsibility:  A 
Multinational Study of Marketing Professionals, 35 EUROPEAN J. MARKETING 133, 149–50 
(2001); Anusorn Singhapakdi, Scott J. Vitell, Kumar C. Rallapalli & Kenneth L. Kraft, The 
Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility:  A Scale of Development, 15 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 1131, 1137–38 (1996). 
 93. Cf. Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Americans Don’t Hate Taxes, They Hate Paying Taxes, 44 
U.B.C. L. REV. 835, 842–43 (2011) (arguing for increased “tax consciousness” to inform 
citizens about the role of government revenue in society). 
 94. See generally Alfonso Morales, Income Tax Compliance and Alternative Views of 
Ethics and Human Nature, 1 J. ACCT. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 380, 382 (1998) (arguing that 
attitudes toward tax compliance and taxation “are rarely homogenous”). 
 95. For example, in Japan, a comparatively high level of tax compliance can be 
explained in part by the general respect that the Japanese have for their legal system. See, 
e.g., Jin Kwon Hyun, Tax Compliances in Korea and Japan:  Why Are They Different (Feb. 
2005) (unpublished draft manuscript prepared for seminar held by the Policy Research 
Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan). 
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collection, taxpayers may view themselves as having a greater stake in the 
revenue collection system.  Moreover, in such countries, tax professionals 
may be less likely to engage in aggressive tax planning.96  On the other 
hand, despite the cultural influences, the United States has relatively high 
(although declining) tax compliance as compared to most other countries, 
because of its strong withholding and tax information reporting 
requirements and its relatively effective tax collection agency.97  In 
addition, the studies are divided on whether tax professionals in the United 
States are more or less likely to engage in ethical decision making and, 
hence, are more or less likely to engage in aggressive tax planning.98  A 
general program of education directed at the American public and 
professionals could stress the obligations of residents to pay taxes and the 
benefits that residents enjoy from the publicly supported system of 
government. 
 
 96. Cf., e.g., Aileen Smith & Evelyn C. Hume, Linking Culture and Ethics:  A 
Comparison of Accountants’ Ethical Belief Systems in the Individualism/Collectivism and 
Power Distance Contexts, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 209, 217 (2005) (concluding that accountants in 
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collectivistic societies, such as Mexico and Venezuela, “are more likely to subordinate 
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BUS. ETHICS 373 (1998); Michael J. O’Fallon & Kenneth D. Butterfield, A Review of the 
Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature:  1996–2003, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 375 (2005) 
(concluding that nationality does appear to influence ethical decision making, but it is 
unclear to what extent). 
 97. See Michael Hatfield, Tax Lawyers, Tax Defiance, and the Ethics of Casual 
Conversation, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 841, 845 (2011) (stating that the United States has “one of 
the highest voluntary compliance rates in the world”); see also Leandra Lederman, The 
Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 
1475–77 (2003) (discussing possible societal norm of tax compliance in the United States); 
Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps:  The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2007) (discussing effectiveness of withholding 
and information reporting in increasing tax compliance in the United States); Leandra 
Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 973 (2003) 
(discussing the lack of causation between increased penalties and increased voluntary 
compliance).  However, seriously inadequate budget resources and never-ending attacks by 
politicians and the news media have demoralized the IRS and undermined its effectiveness 
as a revenue collection agency. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Slashing the IRS Budget—Penny-
Wise and Pound-Foolish, FISCAL TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/ 
Columns/2014/01/17/Slashing-IRS-Budget-Penny-Wise-and-Pound-Foolish (opining that 
cuts to the IRS budget are undermining tax compliance) [https://perma.cc/8LWY-HQNC]. 
 98. See, e.g., O’Fallon & Butterfield, supra note 96, at 387–91; cf. Ordower, supra note 
1, at 120–24 (discussing the culture of tax avoidance in the United States and Europe, and 
noting that such culture has spread to lower- and middle-income taxpayers). 
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A significant factor in tax professional conduct involves the way these 
highly educated individuals embrace a professional identity that ties their 
obligations to the integrity of the tax system.99  For lawyers, this principle is 
referred to as “lawyer professionalism” and often includes notions of what 
it means to be an officer of the court and a professional acting within an 
adversarial system.100  When lawyers began to engage in “Rambo 
litigation” tactics, bar authorities and courts turned to civility codes based 
upon notions of professionalism.101  For a tax professional advising a client, 
the question becomes whether the individual is a “consultant or information 
specialist[]”102 or a member of a profession that has a higher calling or 
obligation to the system, which, in turn, places constraints upon the 
individual’s conduct on behalf of the client.  For a tax professional, the 
participation in the client’s tax reporting process ties the individual 
professional to the civic fiscal obligations of a resident of the United 
States.103  Moreover, the professional’s representation of the taxpayer in 
this revenue collection process involves both parties in the civic virtues of a 
self-assessment system.104  As mentioned above, it is difficult to know with 
any degree of certainty whether tax professionals are simply agents of their 
clients or the drivers of aggressive noncompliant behavior with respect to 
payment of taxes.  Regardless of the answer to this important question, the 
regulation of tax professionals has the potential to change significantly the 
behavior of their clients regarding the payment of taxes. 
III.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING 
THE REGULATION OF TAX ADVISERS 
When a tax professional gives a client advice to take an aggressive tax 
position or when a tax professional lures a client into a tax-motivated 
transaction, significant costs are imposed upon the tax system.105  The first 
 
 99. See Hatfield, supra note 97, at 856–57. 
 100. See ABA, COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:  A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986). 
 101. See Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism As Class Ideology:  Civility Codes and Bar 
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 661–62 (1994). 
 102. Hatfield, supra note 97, at 856 (citing Rostain, supra note 57, at 120 (using the terms 
“mere consultant or legal information specialists”)). 
 103. Cf. Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a 
Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 59–60 (2007) (discussing the tax return 
filing process as serving an important ceremonial function of expressing fiscal citizenship). 
 104. See generally Ajay K. Mehrotra, Reviving Fiscal Citizenship, 113 MICH. L. REV. 943 
(2015) (reviewing LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040:  TWO CHEERS FOR 
THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX (2013)). Cf. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST 
LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 109 (1993) (explaining that 
professionalism arises from the notions of the lawyer-statesman). 
 105. See Weisbach, supra note 1, at 223.  Professor Weisbach argues that 
no moral or philosophical basis for the right to tax plan has yet been articulated.  
There is no constitutional right.  There is not even an explicit statutory right.  
There is, in short, no basis for a right to tax plan other than statements made up out 
of thin air by a few judges using questionable theories of statutory interpretation. 
Id. at 221.  He goes on to opine that 
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and most basic cost involves the lost revenue to the government.  To the 
extent that some taxpayers and tax professionals routinely take aggressive 
positions, the revenue burden is shifted to other taxpayers, thus 
undermining the fairness of distribution of the tax burden.  Stated 
differently, these taxpayers and their tax advisers are imposing external 
costs on other taxpayers in the form of higher taxes, which they do not take 
into account and which are not reflected in the price system.106  A second 
cost of undisclosed aggressive tax positions involves exploitation of gaps 
and loopholes in the law.  If the gaps are not brought to the IRS’s attention, 
the IRS cannot accurately measure the cost of the gap in terms of lost 
revenue and cannot take action to close the gap when it is contrary to the 
intent of the drafters of the statutory or regulatory provisions.  Moreover, 
the nondisclosed position prevents the IRS from asserting properly its legal 
position in a public way so as to discourage others from adopting similar 
positions.  A third cost is the undermining of taxpayer morale from the 
inconsistent application of the tax law resulting from aggressive tax 
planning.107  Inconsistent application of the tax law by taxpayers and tax 
advisers leads to inconsistent tax liabilities by taxpayers in similar 
economic circumstances.  A properly disclosed and challenged position that 
leads to a pro-taxpayer decision clarifies the tax law and ensures that 
similarly situated taxpayers will receive similar treatment. 
In this Article, we advance several proposals as part of our view that tax 
professionals owe a duty to the tax system.  The current ethical and 
regulatory environment is insufficient to prevent tax professionals from 
undermining the integrity of the tax system by advising clients to adopt 
aggressive return positions that are not likely to prevail.  The view that a tax 
return is an adversarial proceeding is erroneous and is inconsistent with 
developments in other areas of federally regulated conduct.  Filings with 
banking and securities regulators are not viewed as adversarial proceedings.  
Filings with the U.S. Patent Office require a duty of candor.  Of course, 
when tax lawyers represent clients in litigation with the government, their 
duty of loyalty to the client in an adversarial proceeding  involves the same 
level of zealous lawyering as required of other lawyers in litigation. 
A.  The Failure of Self-Regulation 
to Limit Tax Professionals’ Misbehavior 
The ABA has often resisted efforts to develop ethics rules for specialized 
areas of practice, including tax law.108  It firmly embraces the notion that a 
 
all tax planning, not just planning associated with traditional notions of shelters, 
produces nothing of value.  Nothing is gained by finding new ways to turn 
ordinary income into capital gain, to push a gain offshore, or to generate losses. 
Id. at 222.  He concludes that planning “is almost always positively bad for society.” Id. 
 106. Id. at 223. 
 107. See, e.g., Ordower, supra note 1, at 111–20. 
 108. See, e.g., Marvin K. Collie & Thomas P. Marinis, Jr., Ethical Considerations on 
Discovery of Error in Tax Returns, 22 TAX LAW. 455, 460–61 (1969); Durst, supra note 5, at 
1037–38; Galler, supra note 5, at 694. 
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general model code that includes rules for litigation and nonlitigation 
lawyers can handle the myriad areas of practice by lawyers.  One could 
view the fact that the ABA has issued three ethics opinions on tax practice 
over the years as unusual attention devoted to the area of tax practice.  
Some of the attention devoted to the tax practitioner has come from the fact 
that elite lawyers who were leaders in the profession engaged in the debate 
over tax professional standards.109  The ABA Section of Taxation sought to 
play an important role in the debate over appropriate ethical standards110 
and represented the ABA’s efforts to assert self-regulation over lawyers 
practicing tax law.  One also must acknowledge that the ABA’s efforts to 
address tax practice also could be motivated by anticompetitive concerns 
about accountants and other qualified professionals who, through federal 
preemption, have been allowed to practice in the tax law area.111 
As discussed above, the ABA adopted the “reasonable basis” standard in 
Opinion 314 and the “realistic possibility of success” standard in Opinion 
352.112  Both opinions were grounded in the explicit assumption that the 
filing of a tax return is an adversarial proceeding, and therefore the ethical 
rules of advocacy apply.  The ABA could have adopted a different view:  
that filing a tax return is a transactional representation that creates certain 
obligations for the tax professional.  Trying to fit the filing of a return into a 
specific category is difficult because this representation does not clearly fit 
within advocacy or nonlitigation.  A taxpayer is legally obligated to self-
report income and expenses to the government according to the law.  She is 
not obligated to pay one penny more than what the law requires, but the 
self-reporting system relies to a great extent upon honesty and 
forthrightness.  Although our self-assessment system is accompanied by an 
extensive withholding and information reporting system, tax professionals 
play a crucial role in taxpayer self-assessment. 
To equate the filing of a return with the filing of a brief in a tribunal is 
flawed on many grounds.  Litigation presumes an adversarial proceeding 
before a neutral and impartial judge.  Advocacy is accompanied by an 
extensive system of discovery and cross-examination.113  Positions adopted 
by opposing advocates are contested and presented to judges, and 
sometimes juries, in an effort to arrive at a reasoned decision.  Taxpayers 
file returns in response to tax form queries about income, expenses, 
transactions, and business relationships.  Although taxpayers may assert 
different characterizations of the facts or the law, the government cannot 
easily determine those positions unless they are disclosed or uncovered 
during an audit.  At that time, one could view the positions of the taxpayer 
 
 109. See, e.g., Caplin, supra note 5; Corneel, supra note 5; Paul, supra note 5. 
 110. See Paul J. Sax, The Section’s Role in Ethics and the Standards of Tax Practice, 68 
TAX LAW. 59 (2014). 
 111. See generally Dzienkowski, supra note 29, at 60; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 
35, at 93–94. 
 112. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 113. See generally Prescott, supra note 5 (challenging the adversarial characterization of 
tax return process). 
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and government as adversarial and more similar to a dispute involving 
advocacy. 
Once the ABA adopted the view that a tax professional advising a client 
in a tax return involves an adversarial proceeding, the standards of 
reasonableness or realistic possibility of success became unworkable in the 
American tax system.  Those standards allowed lawyers to advise clients in 
the two waves of tax shelters and to discuss the audit lottery with their 
clients.  Ultimately, the legal profession’s attempts to define the standards 
and regulate tax lawyers have failed.114  State bar disciplinary actions have 
played a relatively small role in regulating the conduct of tax 
practitioners.115  Thus, Congress was forced to enact statutory provisions, 
and the Treasury and the IRS issued regulations, to help define appropriate 
conduct in advising taxpayers in our self-assessment system.  The two 
waves of tax shelter abuses pushed the Treasury and the IRS to act swiftly 
and with resolve to address professionals who were advising clients to 
adopt very aggressive tax positions that were not disclosed in filed tax 
returns and who were issuing tax opinions based on unreasonable factual 
assumptions. 
We believe that the primary source of regulation for tax professionals 
should lie in Circular 230, or a similar pronouncement, and in the penalty 
provisions directed at professionals in Code provisions such as section 
6694.  A comprehensive regulatory scheme administered by the IRS for 
those who practice law or prepare tax returns in the federal tax area is the 
appropriate mechanism for enforcing federal tax ethics.  The federal tax 
system is a highly specialized national system, and the ethics rules that 
apply to federal tax practitioners should be uniform across the states and 
should be developed and administered by the federal administrative agency 
in charge of the tax system:  the IRS.  This is an area of professional 
practice where the federalization of ethics rules is quite appropriate.116  As 
discussed below, state bars still would have a supplementary role to play in 
the ethical rule areas that are best regulated at the state level. 
B.  The Need for Congressional Clarification of the Treasury 
and the IRS’s Authority to Regulate Tax Practitioners Expansively 
As discussed above, self-regulation by national and state bars and 
accounting organizations has not proven sufficient to regulate effectively 
the professional conduct of tax advisers.  Thus, in addition to such self-
 
 114. Professor Holmes argues that such tax enforcement system failures arise because of 
“low audit and detection rates, combined with inadequate penalties, insufficient reputational 
constraints, and enormous information asymmetries.” Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer 
As Gatekeeper, 49 LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 193 (2010). 
 115. See, e.g., Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy:  The 
Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 123, 139 (2011) (“In this world of tax conduct, there is relatively little 
discussion of bar disciplinary actions.”). 
 116. For the seminal article on the federalization of legal ethics, see Fred C. Zacharias, 
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994).  For an updated view on this topic, 
see Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 115. 
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regulation, federal regulation of tax professionals by the Treasury and the 
IRS is crucial to improving the professionalism of tax advisers.  Circular 
230 is an appropriate vehicle for such regulation, particularly if it is 
amended along the lines suggested in this Article.  However, recent court 
decisions invalidating the attempted regulation of “tax return preparers” 
under Circular 230 have cast into substantial question the validity of this 
system of regulation.117  Although commentators disagree about the effect 
of these court decisions on the continuing significance of Circular 230 as 
applied to tax lawyers and accountants,118 these judicial opinions raise 
serious doubt about the scope of the Treasury’s and the IRS’s authority to 
regulate tax professionals who advise taxpayers with respect to tax planning 
matters that result in a return position. 
The Treasury and the IRS, as well as some leading tax professionals and 
commentators, have believed that the government’s authority to regulate 
those who practice before it includes the authority to regulate those who 
advise clients with respect to tax returns filed with the IRS, as well as those 
who prepare such returns.119  We are of this view and believe that it is 
possible that courts eventually will adopt this view.120  However, because 
the three cases decided to date have taken a narrow view of the 
government’s regulatory authority under Circular 230, we believe that it is 
essential that Congress amend the relevant statutory provision121 and make 
it clear that the Treasury and the IRS have the authority to regulate tax 
return preparers under Circular 230.122  Without congressional clarification, 
 
 117. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) 
did not give the Treasury and the IRS authority to regulate tax return preparers under 
Circular 230); Ridgely v. Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that 31 U.S.C. 
§ 330(a) did not give the Treasury and the IRS authority to regulate under Circular 230 
contingent fees charged by a certified public accountant for preparing and filing ordinary 
refund claims); see also Sexton v. Hawkins, No. 2:13-cv-00893, 2014 WL 5503200 (D. Nev. 
Oct. 30, 2014) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s suit alleging that the IRS lacks authority to 
regulate tax return preparers). 
 118. See, e.g., Dennis B. Drapkin, Loving and Ridgely:  Implications for Practitioners, 
148 TAX NOTES 319 (2015) (concluding that these court decisions, if correctly decided, 
greatly narrow the scope of IRS authority under Circular 230, but that Circular 230 may still 
have continuing significance for tax practitioners); Amy S. Elliott, Hawkins Asserts Her 
Authority to Regulate Lawyers, 147 TAX NOTES 516 (2015) (noting disagreement between 
the former head of the Treasury’s Office of Professional Responsibility and some leading 
practitioners about the effect of these decisions on the application of Circular 230 to tax 
lawyers and accountants). 
 119. See, e.g., Loving, 742 F.3d at 1016–22 (rejecting the government’s argument). 
 120. We believe that one can argue persuasively that the government’s statutory authority 
to administer the tax system carries with it an inherent authority to regulate professionals 
who practice before it, including tax return preparers.  Further development of this argument 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 121. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing the Treasury to “regulate the practice of 
representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury”). 
 122. Many returns are prepared by unregulated tax return preparers. See, e.g., SIMON, 
supra note 70, at 52 (estimating that 54 percent of preparers are unregulated).  Therefore, 
any effective system of federal regulation that aims to raise the accuracy and legitimacy of 
taxpayer returns filed by return preparers must apply to them.  Among other things, not 
including such preparers within the regulatory system creates an unfair competitive 
advantage for them and undermines the regulatory scheme by creating an incentive for 
2016] THE DECLINE IN TAX ADVISER PROFESSIONALISM 2743 
the uncertainty that these decisions engendered will have a chilling effect 
on IRS application of Circular 230 and will undermine the effectiveness of 
this system of regulation.  As we discuss below, the IRS needs to be more 
assertive and expansive in its application of Circular 230 to tax 
practitioners, not less so. 
C.  Administering a Consistent and Uniform Set of 
Higher Standards for Tax Professionals 
As discussed above, under the current rules in Circular 230 and the 
preparer penalty rules in section 6694, in non-tax shelter situations, tax 
professionals’ advice to clients must be based upon substantial authority if 
the clients do not plan to disclose the position in the tax return.123  If the 
taxpayers plan to disclose the position, the tax professionals can ground 
their advice on the “reasonable basis” standard.124  Special rules apply for 
tax shelters:  tax professionals’ positions must be based upon a “more likely 
than not” standard, regardless of whether the transaction is disclosed in the 
tax return.125 
We believe that the “more likely than not” standard should continue to 
apply to tax professionals with respect to transactions meeting the 
Treasury’s definition of a tax shelter, regardless of whether disclosed in a 
return.  With respect to non-tax shelter return positions, we believe that all 
tax advice given to taxpayers with respect to the filing of a tax return should 
satisfy a “more likely than not” standard if the taxpayer does not plan to 
disclose the position to the IRS.126  If the position will be disclosed on the 
tax return, then the tax professional should be able to base the advice upon 
the “reasonable basis” standard.127  When a taxpayer completes and files a 
tax return with the assistance of a professional, the taxpayer has the right to 
make a choice whether to take a position that is within the mainstream 
interpretation of the tax law and to rely upon such an undisclosed position 
in arriving at the taxes owed to the Treasury.  However, if a taxpayer seeks 
to adopt a more aggressive position, the taxpayer should be able to do so 
 
clients to use them instead of regulated tax advisers.  Moreover, the lack of regulation of 
such preparers leaves client-taxpayers open to exploitation. Id. at 52–53. 
 123. See CIRCULAR 230, supra note 15, § 10.34(a)(1); I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2012). 
 124. See I.R.C. § 6694(a); CIRCULAR 230, supra note 15, § 10.34(a)(1). 
 125. See CIRCULAR 230, supra note 15, § 10.34(a)(1); I.R.C. § 6694(a). 
 126. We acknowledge that in a world of globalized professional practices involving 
advice given in connection with cross-border transactions, our proposal arguably could 
create a competitive disadvantage for U.S. tax professionals in connection with tax advice 
given with respect to the U.S. tax consequences of cross-border transactions because foreign 
professionals not admitted to practice before the IRS would not be subject to these 
requirements.  However, if, as we strongly urge, the standard for the substantial 
understatement penalty is also raised in accordance with our proposal, then taxpayers subject 
to U.S. tax will pressure their advisers to meet the elevated standard in order to provide them 
with protection from the section 6662 penalty.  Moreover, the Treasury and the IRS should 
work with their counterparts in other countries, through international organizations such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, to elevate the standards 
applicable to all tax advisers. 
 127. We would define “reasonable basis” as similar to the definition of “realistic 
possibility of success,” rather than a lower-level, merely nonfrivolous standard. 
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with the caveat that the position is subject to disclosure to and possibly 
scrutiny by the IRS.  Of course, once a tax return is subject to an audit, 
administrative appeal, or litigation, the tax professional’s advice and 
positions for a client should be subject to the normal ethical rules that apply 
in the litigation context, rather than these proposed standards. 
We believe that the standard in section 6662 for avoiding the substantial 
understatement penalty for undisclosed taxpayer return positions also 
should be raised to the “more likely than not” standard that we propose 
should apply to tax practitioners.  Increasing the standard for tax 
practitioners in Circular 230 and the preparer penalty in section 6694 while 
retaining the substantial authority standard in section 6662 creates a conflict 
of interest between the tax practitioner and client, as well as undesirable 
tensions between the practitioner and client. 
Some have argued that any standard higher than “reasonable basis” for 
the tax professional is too high and enlists the practitioner as a “quasi-IRS 
agent.”128  This argument was made in the context of proposed increases in 
the tax practitioner standard and begins with the assumption that 
professionals have no control over what positions their clients eventually 
adopt in returns.  Moreover, if the client’s return is challenged, the tax 
professional’s advice comes into issue.  Opponents argue that when 
taxpayers’ positions are subject to a substantial understatement penalty, and 
their professionals are subject to a disciplinary penalty, a serious conflict 
arises that threatens to undermine the client-practitioner relationship and 
client confidentiality.129 
We acknowledge that there is a legitimate concern that raising the 
standard to “more likely than not” for tax professionals and taxpayers may 
create a tax practitioner-client conflict and may give the IRS improper 
leverage over the professional, the taxpayer, or both.  To deal with these 
concerns, the IRS should dispose of taxpayer liability and penalties before it 
undertakes scrutiny of the tax professional’s conduct.130  By completing the 
taxpayer’s case first, the government largely avoids placing the taxpayer’s 
and professional’s interests in conflict. 
Some have argued that requiring increased disclosure of questionable 
return positions presents other practical problems.  It is argued that 
requiring disclosure of all positions that do not meet the “more likely than 
not” standard would inundate the IRS with so much data that it could not 
efficiently and effectively review the disclosure forms.131  To deal with this 
 
 128. Ventry & Borden, supra note 6, at 163. 
 129. Id. at 163–64; see also Ordower, supra note 1, at 93.  These conflicts concerns are 
reduced if the standards applicable to tax practitioners and to taxpayers are both elevated to 
the same higher “more likely than not” standard. 
 130. See Ventry & Borden, supra note 6, at 178.  Congress has made it clear that the IRS 
must instruct its employees that they cannot threaten to use preparer discipline or preparer 
penalties during a taxpayer examination or Appeals conference. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, 
at 1406 (1989); H.R. CONF. REP. 101-386, at 662–63 (1989). 
 131. See Ventry & Borden, supra note 6, at 178; see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX 
SEC., REPORT ON THE DEFINITION OF “TAX RETURN PREPARER” AND OTHER ISSUES UNDER 
CODE SECTIONS 6694, 6695, and 7701(a)(36), at 2 (2007). 
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over-disclosure problem, the IRS should design a disclosure form that 
includes questions that would allow it to assess more easily the impact of 
the taxpayer’s uncertain or questionable return position on the tax liability 
and to determine the precise nature of the uncertain position.132  The IRS 
could then establish a policy of reviewing only those positions that were 
significant to the government from a revenue loss perspective.  The nature 
of the position disclosed also could give the IRS significant information 
about areas of the law that need legislative change or further administrative 
guidance.  New transactions may present challenges to taxpayers who apply 
established legal concepts to determine tax liability.  A properly designed 
disclosure form combined with modern data analytics could provide the 
government with valuable information about interpretative problems and 
statutory glitches in these new areas of the law.  Modern computer software 
and systems design should make it easier for the IRS to process and analyze 
these disclosure forms in an efficient way. 
Commentators also argue that increased disclosure requirements will 
increase taxpayers’ costs of compliance with the tax laws and will 
financially benefit tax professionals by increasing the work needed to 
prepare a tax return and by engendering changes in the laws and regulations 
that complicate the law and thereby produce more work for tax 
professionals.133  Under our proposal, we acknowledge that when taxpayers 
choose to implement strategies with less than a “more likely than not” basis, 
they will need to absorb the cost of documenting and disclosing the position 
to the government.  We also acknowledge that Congress could adopt 
substantive law changes increasing the scope of tax withholding and 
information reporting so that gains from transactions would require 
payment of withholding taxes to the IRS and taxpayers would need to seek 
refunds of such withheld amounts through tax returns.  Such an approach 
would require affirmative statements from taxpayers and tax professionals 
to the IRS regarding the tax positions being taken and could significantly 
reduce the number of nondisclosed aggressive return positions.134 
D.  Creating a Robust Regulatory Structure 
for Regulating Tax Professionals 
The Treasury and the IRS have made significant strides in creating a 
structure for regulation of tax professionals under the guidance of Circular 
230.  However, this structure should be continuously reevaluated to 
 
 132. Cf. Raskolnikov, supra note 1, at 625 n.223 (discussing the appropriate nature of 
disclosure in the context of the author’s innovative penalty proposal).  If the return position 
would have a significant effect on the taxpayer’s tax liability, the disclosure form could 
require that the taxpayer inform the government of exactly what she thinks the uncertainty 
is, the material issues involved in the uncertainty, and the pro and con arguments on each 
such issue. Cf. id. 
 133. See David A. Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure As an Approach to Shelters, 54 
SMU L. REV. 73, 78–79 (2001); Weisbach, supra note 1, at 226–28. 
 134. As noted supra note 7, any detailed discussion of increased withholding and 
information reporting obligations as a solution to the tax compliance problem is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
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increase its effectiveness in achieving the regulatory objectives.  As 
discussed below, this Article argues for a reexamination of the role of the 
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR or “the Office”), an expansion 
of the regulation of supervisory professionals and firms, and a more 
systematic and effective collaboration of the federal regulatory structure 
with state bar and accounting disciplinary systems. 
1.  Reexamining the Role of the 
Office of Professional Responsibility 
The Treasury has sought to regulate standards of tax practice since 1922 
through a series of pronouncements that were codified into Circular 230 in 
1966.  This development of codes of tax practice mirrors what occurred in 
the ABA with the development and evolution of general ethics rules from 
the original 1906 Canons of Professional Ethics to the more explicit 
codification in the 1969 Model Code.  In theory, Circular 230 was formerly 
enforced by the Office of the Director of Practice, a small office with 
limited resources. 
In 2004, the Treasury reorganized the enforcement function of tax 
professionals into a newly formed OPR, with a substantially increased 
budget and staff.  The OPR was given the responsibility for receiving 
referrals and investigating possible misconduct.  The Office was based upon 
other federal practitioner regulatory systems in securities and banking, and 
it relied upon a more general cooperation within the entire Treasury.135 
Under the expanded jurisdiction that it attained under the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004,136 the OPR clearly viewed its role as an active 
regulatory agency over tax professionals’ conduct in representing 
taxpayers.137  It has a similar design to state disciplinary authorities in that 
it receives referrals from others, including IRS agents, taxpayers, and other 
tax professionals.  An investigating attorney is responsible for making a 
determination of whether the Office should pursue discipline against a tax 
professional.  Once a decision is made to go forward, formal or informal 
notice is given to the professional to initiate a proceeding to determine 
whether discipline will ensue.  Unquestionably, the OPR represents a 
significant improvement in federal regulation of tax professionals’ 
behavior.  However, much more work needs to be done to improve its 
effectiveness. 
The OPR began its work by relying upon many basic provisions in 
Circular 230 that required practitioners to verify information provided to 
the IRS.  These basic provisions were extremely useful in disciplining tax 
professionals who made false statements or misrepresentations in filings.  
 
 135. See Kevin E. Thorn, A Rare Look Inside the IRS’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Apr./May 2006, at 37, 37. 
 136. See Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822 (2004). 
 137. See Thorn, supra note 135. See generally Kip Dellinger, The IRS As Regulator of 
Federal Tax Practice:  Circular 230, 90 TAXES, Apr. 2012, at 21; Burgess J.W. Raby & 
William L. Raby, Confidence Levels, Circular 230, and Practitioner Penalties, 106 TAX 
NOTES 187 (2005). 
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Several waves of Treasury amendments to Circular 230 changed the nature 
of the OPR’s power.  In 2004, the OPR was given authority to issue 
monetary sanctions against entities such as law firms and accounting firms. 
Although the promise of effective regulation is evident from the structure 
of the OPR, the bulk of the cases processed by the Office seem to address 
bright-line, fundamental wrongs committed by small practitioners as 
opposed to sanctioning tax professionals in large law or accounting firms 
who fail to comply with the Circular 230 rules.  Some of the shortcomings 
in this system of regulation are attributable to the reduced funding for the 
IRS in recent years, which affects all parts of the IRS, including the 
OPR.138  Other problems arise from the difficulty of discovering a tax 
professional’s noncompliant behavior in a complaint-based system. 
Very few of the cases reported address the advice provided by tax 
practitioners to client taxpayers with respect to questionable return positions 
and whether such advice meets the Circular 230 standards.  Yet, tax 
professionals’ advice to taxpayers with respect to their tax returns is a 
fundamental aspect of the self-assessment system.  The OPR needs to take 
seriously its responsibility to examine tax practitioners’ behavior in this 
area. 
Another area in need of attention in Circular 230 is the provisions that 
relate to ethics training of tax practitioners.  If we want tax professionals to 
take ethical considerations more seriously when advising clients regarding 
their tax obligations and we want to foster improvement in tax 
professionals’ ethical behavior, we need increased emphasis on ethics in the 
training of tax professionals.139  There are some studies showing that tax 
professionals “who discount the importance of ethical and socially 
responsible conduct are more likely to facilitate aggressive corporate tax 
avoidance schemes.”140  Thus, requiring tax professionals to undertake 
properly designed professional ethics training to sensitize them to their 
ethical obligations as tax professionals and to socially responsible behavior 
should have some effect in reducing their willingness to engage in overly 
aggressive tax-avoidance transactions.141  To be most effective, this training 
should use specific tax-related case studies that present realistic ethical 
dilemmas in the work setting.142  This ethics training should be designed to 
 
 138. IRS ADVISORY COUNCIL, GENERAL REPORT 8–10 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-utl/2015-IRSAC-Full-Report (discussing a 17 percent reduction in IRS funding since 
fiscal year 2010 and its detrimental effect on the IRS’s enforcement and service functions) 
[https://perma.cc/7J99-VFHF]. 
 139. See SIMON, supra note 70, at 48–49 (stating that “ethics training is likely to help tax 
practitioners avoid client pressure to take unwarranted positions”). 
 140. Shafer & Simmons, supra note 87, at 710 (studying Hong Kong tax professionals). 
 141. See id. at 711; see also Doyle, Hughes & Summers, supra note 24, at 335. 
 142. See Doyle, Hughes & Summers, supra note 24, at 335 (stating that ethical training 
for tax practitioners should take into account their low level of moral reasoning in 
approaching ethical dilemmas in the work context); see also Donna D. Bobek & Robin R. 
Radtke, An Experiential Investigation of Tax Professionals’ Ethical Environments, 29 J. AM. 
TAX’N ASS’N, Fall 2007, at 63 (proposing ethics training that uses specific tax-related 
scenarios); Scott A. Yetmar & Kenneth K. Eastman, Tax Practitioners’ Ethical Sensitivity:  
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address the varying ethical issues that arise in different types of tax practice, 
instead of using a “one size fits all” approach.143  It should be designed to 
be pervasive in nature and to improve the ethical climate within the tax 
practitioner’s work setting to one of tax planning that complies with the law 
and the tax professionals’ ethical obligations.  Among other things, this 
ethics training should encompass “discourse ethics,” which focuses on the 
communications between the tax practitioner and the client to arrive at a 
course of action in an ethically responsible way.144  Along these lines, 
Circular 230 could be amended to require periodic, substantial ethics 
training in order to retain qualification to practice before the Treasury and 
IRS.  The limited two hours of ethics continuing legal education required 
under current Circular 230145 is not enough and, in any event, does not 
seem to require the kind of ethics training that we have in mind. 
2.  Expanding the Regulation of 
Supervisory Professionals and Firms 
Traditionally, bar authorities and the federal regulatory system focused 
upon identifying individual tax professionals’ misconduct rather than 
disciplining the firm in which they are employed.  The need for federal 
authority to regulate law and accounting firms that deliver tax advice to 
clients became evident in the tax shelter scandals.146  In the second wave of 
tax shelters, the government used its power to obtain information from 
accounting and law firms about firm clients, not just the clients of 
individual professionals that had adopted the tax shelter products.  The 
government imposed fines upon the professional entities and even 
negotiated a closure of one law firm responsible for marketing abusive 
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shelters in lieu of further prosecution.147  Such efforts were directed by 
investigators and prosecutors in examining and prosecuting the 
professionals and firms that were involved in the tax shelter marketing 
efforts. 
Professors Tanina Rostain and Milton C. Regan, Jr. have aptly noted that 
inadequate regulatory attention has been given “to the organizational 
influences that shape the conduct of tax professionals working in firms” and 
that “the rise of the shelter industry illustrates [that] wrongdoing by 
professional firms is a product of interactions among its environment, 
structure, and the cognitive and decision-making dynamics generated by the 
specialization and diffusion of responsibility.”148  The focus on individual 
conduct does not give the government sufficient regulatory power over the 
way in which tax advice is delivered in the modern law and accounting 
professions.  As a result, it fails to provide the incentives necessary to 
ensure proper compliance with the rules. 
In 2004, the Treasury amended Circular 230 to include the possibility of 
imposing a monetary penalty on an employer, firm, or entity if an 
individual who is subject to sanction under Circular 230 for improper 
conduct was acting on behalf of such employer, firm, or entity and the 
employer, firm, or entity knew or should have known of such conduct.149  
The amount of such penalty cannot “exceed the gross income derived (or to 
be derived) from the conduct giving rise to the penalty.”150 
The imposition of monetary penalties on law or accounting firms by the 
Treasury and the IRS can provide a strong incentive for such firms to 
establish compliance systems for their tax professionals.  Such firm-level 
penalties also have the advantage of providing the Treasury and the IRS 
with much needed revenue for their compliance functions and of forcing the 
professional firms engaged in overly aggressive tax schemes to internalize, 
at least in part, the external costs that they are imposing on society with 
their failure to ensure compliance by their tax professionals with Circular 
230 and other ethical and legal obligations. 
If firm-level sanctions imposed on law and accounting firms are 
announced to the public, as they should be, the sanctions also have the 
benefit of utilizing shaming as a means to deter future wrongful conduct by 
these and other firms.  Such shaming sanctions used in connection with 
professional tax services firms may be effective because shaming damages 
their reputational capital, an important asset for such firms.  Regardless of 
whether shaming sanctions imposed on corporate taxpayers work to deter 
their participation in abusive tax shelters,151 shaming sanctions applied to 
 
 147. See, e.g., ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 3, at 310–11 (discussing a large fine 
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 149. See CIRCULAR 230, supra note 15, § 10.50(c)(1)(ii). 
 150. Id. § 10.50(c)(2). 
 151. See Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. 
REV. 539 (2009) (arguing that shaming sanctions on corporate taxpayers likely would not 
work in deterring them from investing in abusive tax shelters and could have the effect of 
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law and accounting firms with respect to their tax work probably will have 
some effect in encouraging the firms to take reasonable measures to secure 
future compliance with the ethical rules.  Law firms and accounting firms 
who disregard these shaming sanctions and repeatedly violate the Circular 
230 and state bar and accounting ethical rules risk serious loss of business 
from taxpayers who want to avoid high-risk, overly aggressive tax planning 
strategies.152 
In 2014, the Treasury also amended Circular 230 to add possible 
disciplinary liability for individuals who have principal authority and 
responsibility for overseeing a firm’s federal tax practice delivered to 
clients.153  Roughly paralleling the requirements of Model Rule 5.1, the IRS 
decided to extend its regulatory authority to supervisory professionals.  
When a tax professional individually or through shared responsibility 
undertakes a supervisory role in a department that performs federal tax 
work regulated by Circular 230, that professional must take reasonable 
steps to see that the firm has adequate procedures in place to ensure that 
others in the firm follow the Circular 230 rules.  This provision imposes 
disciplinary liability on the principal supervisory professionals in a firm for 
failing to ensure compliance by others in the firm through “willfulness, 
recklessness, or gross incompetence.”154  This provision significantly 
expands the reach of federal regulation of professionals within a firm.  To 
date, it appears that the OPR has not done much to utilize these provisions, 
and we would urge the IRS to make greater use of them in the future. 
The expansion of regulatory authority over law and accounting firms and 
supervisory lawyers gives the IRS the authority to require large- and 
medium-sized law and accounting firms to establish internal legal and tax 
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quality and risk management systems that monitor reportable transactions 
and tax personnel compliance with the tax shelter registration and other 
requirements of the Code.155  These procedures can include careful internal 
review of the issuance of any legal opinions supporting aggressive tax-
minimization strategies.156  In addition, these firms can be required to 
establish internal procedures that help ensure legal and ethical behavior in 
their tax practices, including establishing an ethics oversight committee, 
providing appropriate channels for ethical concerns about firm practices to 
be raised and handled, and providing for periodic third-party review of its 
legal and ethical behavior.157  This form of outsourcing through the use of 
third-party, private sector monitors to address serious noncompliance 
problems can help alleviate the substantial resource constraints on both the 
IRS generally and the OPR in particular.158  One example of such a 
regulatory framework is set forth in the 2012 nonprosecution agreement 
entered into between Ernst & Young and the U.S. Justice Department.159  
Such procedures can be accomplished through “cooperative” regulation by 
agreements between the large law and accounting firms and the Treasury 
and the IRS.160  This regulatory approach, by involving the professional 
firms in the design of the procedures, has the advantage of incorporating 
concerns about the firms’ duties to their clients as well as their duties to the 
tax system in such design.  It thus offsets, to a significant extent, the 
substantive biases of the Treasury and the IRS as regulatory agencies.161 
One alternative would be for the Treasury and the IRS to amend Circular 
230 to impose disciplinary liability on law and accounting firms for serious 
violations of the Circular 230 rules by members and professional employees 
of the firm in situations where the firm failed to establish firm-level 
measures for ensuring compliance with the rules.162  The sanctions for such 
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firm liability could include firm censure, suspension, or, in extreme cases, 
disbarment from practice before the IRS.  These sanctions would be in 
addition to the monetary penalties that can be imposed on the firm under the 
current provisions of Circular 230.163  If, however, the firm had in place 
measures for ensuring compliance, that would be a defense to the liability 
claim.164 
3.  Collaboration with State Bar 
and Accounting Disciplinary Systems 
Lawyers and accountants who practice law received their professional 
designation through their respective licensure authorities.  As members of a 
profession, lawyers and accountants must continue to follow the rules of 
their profession.  However, when professionals appear before other 
agencies, tribunals, or settings, the rules of practice may vary from their 
traditional standards in their state of licensure.  Thus, professionals who 
appear before a legislature must follow the legislature’s rules, and lawyers 
who appear before tribunals must follow the tribunals’ rules.  Similarly, 
accountants and lawyers who represent clients before the IRS must follow 
the professional standards that the IRS promulgates for those who practice 
before it. 
In this area of mixed source regulation, greater and more effective 
coordination among the regulators has many potential benefits.  When the 
OPR discovers that a professional has violated the Circular 230 standards 
and such violation raises questions about the professional’s fitness to 
practice law or accounting, the OPR should report the professional to the 
respective state bar or accountancy board.  This may require Congress to 
amend the taxpayer confidentiality statutory provisions to create an 
exception for such reporting. 
Coordinated regulation by the OPR and the relevant state regulatory 
authorities has the potential for a more efficient and complete regulatory 
structure for tax professionals.  Issues relating to tax advice and positions 
on the professional’s own returns are better regulated by the OPR, while 
issues relating to conflicts of interest or breaches of confidentiality are 
probably better regulated by the state bar and accounting professional 
regulatory arms.  State bar and accounting regulators have greater 
experience and expertise in applying the ethical rules relating to conflicts of 
interest, client solicitation, and confidentiality, for example, and dealing 
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with violations of such rules.  The IRS lacks both the resources and 
expertise to regulate attorney and accountant behavior effectively in those 
areas.  It is a better use of the IRS’s scarce resources to regulate the areas of 
tax professionals’ conduct that more directly relate to the agency’s core 
functions of administering the tax system and collecting revenue. 
CONCLUSION 
Taxes are the price that residents pay for government services in a 
civilized society.  The American self-assessment income tax system is the 
cornerstone of how we collect taxes currently in the United States.  Taxes 
connect residents to their government, and the tax reporting and payment 
process is an important annual financial event in the lives of most residents.  
As a result, tax professionals are integral intermediaries in our revenue 
collection system who play an important role in advising taxpayers about 
the proper amount to remit to the government and thereby help the system 
to function properly.  Ensuring that tax practitioners operate in a 
professionally responsible way is an integral part of tax administration by 
the IRS.  Accordingly, if taxes are what we pay for a civilized society, then 
effective regulation of tax practitioners by the Treasury and the IRS is what 
we pay in order to have a properly functioning system to collect those taxes. 
